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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
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names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
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Policy Research Working Paper 5614
This paper takes advantage of the exogenous phasing 
of direct elections in districts and applies the double 
difference estimator to: (i) measure impacts on the 
pattern of public spending and revenue generation at 
the district level; and (ii) investigate the heterogeneity 
of the impacts on public spending. The authors confirm 
that the electoral reforms had positive effects on district 
expenditures and these effects were mainly due to the 
This paper is a product of the Poverty Reduction and Equity Unit, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management 
Network. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to 
development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://
econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at eskoufias@@worldbank.org.  
increases in expenditures in the districts outside Java and 
Bali and the changes in expenditures brought about by 
non-incumbents elected in the districts. Electoral reforms 
also led to higher revenue generation from own sources 
and to higher budget surplus. Finally, the analysis finds 
that in anticipation of the forthcoming direct elections, 
district governments tend to have higher current 
expenditures on public works. 
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1.  Introduction 
The relationship between institutions of political accountability and government 
performance remains a perennial concern for analysts and practitioners of public policy design.  
Both developed and developing countries continue to confront the challenge of how best to 
promote better basic service delivery with the objective of poverty reduction and the attainment of 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  The manner in which citizens can hold their service 
providers accountable has increasingly been recognized as being critical to this equation (World 
Bank, 2004).  A confluence of these concerns can be found around two major on-going policy 
debates.  One has been concerned with the impacts of devolution, or the claims that bringing 
government closer to the people has the potential to make government both more responsive and 
efficient.  The second policy debate has grappled with the extent and nature of electoral 
accountability, whether at national or sub-national levels.  Our paper is concerned with the 
intersection of democracy and decentralization, and in particular with the question of how 
institutional design for electoral accountability affects public sector spending choices and service 
delivery outcomes. 
Political institutions are clearly heterogeneous and endogenous to context.  Transitions from 
autocracy to democracy will be contingent on the balance of political and economic forces in a given 
state-society relationship (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006).  Understanding the mechanisms of 
political selection, i.e. of who takes the reins of leadership, is in turn also critical to understanding 
the behavior of those taking positions of authority (Besley, 2005).  A prominent concern of 
comparative political analysis has been the role of different electoral and institutional arrangements, 
notably parliamentary versus presidential systems.  The former has tended to rely on the indirect 
election of the head of the executive, whereas the latter has mainly relied on direct elections.  Using 
cross-country data, Lederman et. al. (2004) find that democracy, parliamentary systems, democratic 
stability, and freedom of press are associated with lower corruption.  Keefer and Vlaicu (2007) 
highlight how the nature of democracies will matter significantly for national indicators of public 
good provision.  But a fundamental challenge for this empirical literature has been to establish a 
more robust causal link between political institutions and governance or service delivery outcomes, 
given the prevalence of endogeneity and likely unobserved country differences explaining public 
sector behavior and outcomes. 3 
 
A parallel challenge has been faced by the literature seeking to document the link between 
political devolution and local service delivery (Kaiser, 2006).  When decentralization and related 
governance reforms occur at the national level, it is difficult to identify appropriate comparison 
groups to construct a counterfactual for evaluating the impact of such reforms.  Rather than being 
driven by service delivery, decentralization reforms have been outcomes of a range of other political 
forces (Eaton, et al., 2010).  The literature has underscored that outcomes associated with 
decentralization and local governance can be undermined by elite capture and partial 
decentralization (Junaid Ahmad, et al., 2005, Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006, Devarajan, et al., 
2009).  The length of time that typically elapses before such reforms can have a measurable impact 
on poverty and other welfare indicators adds to the difficulties in measuring impacts.  Faguet (2005) 
finds that decentralized governance in Bolivia has improved responsiveness of policy to citizen 
needs through an analysis of sectoral spending trends relative to needs indicators.  The evidence on 
whether decentralization improves service delivery has been highly context specific and subject to 
frequently rather unique identification settings (Ehtisham Ahmad and Brosio, 2009). 
Indonesia‘s dual political transition to democratization and greater devolution from the late 
1990s (Hofman and Kaiser, 2004, 2006) provides a unique opportunity to empirically assess reforms 
in political institutions on government behavior.  The reforms not only assigned several hundred 
local governments across Indonesia with wide-ranging responsibilities over basic service delivery for 
education, health, infrastructure, and general public administration, but also saw the phasing in--the 
manner in which local executive leaders (i.e., mayors) were selected.  Although decentralization was 
implemented in a ―Big Bang‖ in 2001, local leaders were initially indirectly selected by the local 
legislatures.  Starting in 2005, mayors were selected along direct--and more ―presidential‖ rather than 
―parliamentary‖—lines.  The unique empirical aspect of this reform was that the change in political 
selection occurred in a staggered manner, once the old terms subject to indirect elections had come 
to an end.  The timing of the shift to direct elections in a district was determined by whether the 
district head selected by the previous system had served their full tenure, which resulted in direct 
elections being held in a little more than one-third of all (434) districts in June 2005. The remaining 
districts continued to be under the existing regime until the tenure of their heads were over.  By 
2007, around 70 percent of districts had undergone direct elections.  The districts were also different 
in terms of which of the previous systems they were transitioning from.  Some districts moved to 
direct election from a weaker version of democracy where the district head was indirectly elected, 4 
 
while others moved directly from the older ‗New Order‘ (the system of appointing as opposed to 
electing district heads) system to direct election.  These transitions varied across localities, and the 
phasing in of direct elections across local governments was effectively exogenous.  By relating these 
changes to evidence on local spending patterns, we are able to analyze the impact of changes in 
political selection and electoral accountability of institutional arrangements. 
Given these features, the implementation of political decentralization in Indonesia 
approximates a ―natural experiment‖ that is, to the best of our knowledge, rare in the context of a 
reform of this nature on a national scale.
   In most countries in which decentralization has occurred, 
analysis of impacts has been limited to a ―before-after‖ comparison since the timing of the reform 
has provided no scope for constructing separate ―treatment‖ and control/comparison groups. In 
contrast to much of the work in randomized development intervention design, the political nature of 
major public sector reforms such as decentralization and democratization typically makes it very 
hard to socially engineer differential treatment across sub-national governments.  The feature of 
districts switching to direct elections in a phased manner allows us to empirically evaluate the impact 
of increased electoral accountability on the performance of local governments.  Our analysis also 
utilizes the fact that the timing of when a district switches from the earlier system to direct election 
was determined by a seemingly exogenous factor, namely the timing of when the tenure of the 
existing district head would end. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 summarizes the transitions in sub-national 
political accountability mechanisms and decentralization before and after Indonesia‘s ‗New Order‘ 
regime.  Section 3 briefly summarizes the literature concerning the potential link between political 
accountability and public spending and goods provision.  Section 4 discusses the data and empirical 
methodology we use to test whether democratic reform changed public expenditure patterns and 
outcomes across Indonesian districts. Section 5 presents the results from the empirical exercise of 
evaluating impacts, with a special focus on investments in health and education.  Section 6 presents 
the results from the analysis of factors that influence changes in investment pattern, including how 
these changes were associated with the measurable indicators of ―needs‖ of the districts.  Section 7 
concludes the paper. 5 
 
2.   Political Accountability, Devolution, and Local Public Services in Indonesia 
For over three decades (1965-1998), Indonesia‘s ‗New Order’ government under President 
Soeharto could be characterized as a highly centralized and autocratic political regime.  Politics were 
controlled under the ruling Golkar party, and only two notional opposition parties were formally 
allowed.
2  The East Asia economic crisis of 1997/98 disrupted what had been overall a highly 
successful development trajectory until then and highlighted a number of institutional weaknesses of 
the prevailing political regime more of growth (Temple, 2001).  The pressures culminated in the 
downfall of President Suharto in 1998 and significant pressures for political reform (Reformasi). 
Despite the highly centralized rule, the regime did historically allow some space for local 
political representation and local government.  The 1974 Law on Local Government (Law No. 
5/74) provided some degree of bottom-up accountability, including through elections, even if these 
were subject to a high degree of stage management.  Local governments (pemdas) in Indonesia were 
comprised of a regional head (kepala daerah), executive agencies (dinas), and the local assembly (Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah or DPRDs).  Prior to 1999, regional legislators were down from a closed 
list of candidates and all political appointments were dictated by the Ministry of Home Affairs, 
frequently from military backgrounds.  Moreover, local governments were highly dependent on 
earmarks and discretionary transfers, as well as limited own source revenues (Malley, 2003).  The 
bulk of basic service delivery at the local level was in the hands of deconcentrated central offices 
(kanwils).  Even in sectors where local governments had notional primary responsibility, they were in 
effect the poor cousins of central government presence.  But as de facto representatives of the central 
government, local heads already enjoyed a significant degree of convening power. 
Throughout the 1990s, economic progress and demand for greater political autonomy across 
the far-flung archipelago saw growing pressures for greater democratization and decentralization.  In 
June 1999, Indonesia‘s first relatively free and fair elections in 44 years were held, sweeping in a new 
batch of more assertive local legislatures (DPRDs).
3  Elections for district and provincial legislatives 
in Indonesia are conducted along the same 5-year cycle as the national elections, which implies that 
all local legislatures are elected at the same time (i.e., 1999, 2004, and most recently 2009).  In August 
1999, two ground breaking decentralization laws were passed.  These in effect transferred the bulk 
                                                       
2 These incorporated the more nationality-leftist and Islamist strands of Indonesia politics. 
3 Power was transferred from Soeharto to his vice-president Habibie in May 1998, while 48 parties then took part in the 
June 1999 elections.   6 
 
of basic service delivery to 300+ district governments (as opposed to provinces and governors), 
folded the deconcentrated structures into these local government structures and provided them with 
a significant block grant as well as natural resource revenue sharing (World Bank, 2003).  
Although it was not until 2001 that local legislatures had general oversight of a larger 
consolidated local budget (APBD), the newly empowered legislatures had greater control over 
selecting new local heads whose terms were coming to an end (based on a five year cycle), more 
open lists, and more limited edits by the Ministry of Home Affairs (Decree No. 22/1999).  The 1999 
DPRDs also had the right to impeach local heads, thereby prematurely ending their terms upon an 
unsatisfactory delivery of an annual accountability speech.  These cycles were different across local 
governments.  Deviations from this five year cycle, to which we turn in more detail later, were death, 
illness, a no-confidence vote, or the creation of a new district.  As local heads of the executive, 
mayors/walikotas in urban areas and regents/bupatis in rural areas, have significant powers to set the 
priorities of their governments, including the priorities set in the budget (including overall levels and 
types of spending) as well as its execution.  In popular terms they have often been described as raya 
kecil, or little kings, although incumbents are subject to a maximum of two terms. 
Although very much a part of the wave of flourishing democracy, the political powers of the 
local legislatures to select, control, and potentially even dismiss local heads of government soon 
raised a number of concerns.  First, there was a sense that DPRDs were tending to over-reach their 
powers, blurring an effective balance of governance between executive and legislative agencies.  
Among the central and sub-national executive and civil service, there was a growing sense of the 
need to re-balance this relationship.  Second, local politics centered on DPRDs were seen as 
becoming increasingly vulnerable to money politics.  To secure the office of head of local 
government, especially in the wake of larger central government block transfers, or to maintain 
office, regional heads found it easier to pay off the balance of two dozen legislators or so (Mietzner, 
1997).  By narrowly targeting payments to swing legislators, a targeted reward equivalent to the price 
of a car would guarantee staying in office or getting an election vote (Malley, 2003:110).  Since 
legislators themselves had short time horizons and limited programmatic party discipline, they may 
have had limited incentives (and frankly options even in the under idealistic norms) to hold local 
executives to account for greater public good provision. 7 
 
The concerns around indirect political accountability triggered the second wave of local 
government electoral reform toward direct elections (Pilkada Langsung) under Law No. 32/2004) 
(Erb and Sulistiyanto, 2009). This reform made the local head (bupati/walikota) more directly 
accountable to the people by stipulating that (s)he would be directly elected by citizens, and provided a 
clearer definition of the head‘s political functioning. The law stipulated that the head should: (i) 
administer the jurisdiction (daerah) as per the guidelines laid down by DPRD, (ii) implement local 
laws, including budget, (iii) present accountability reports to the DPRD and central government, and 
(iv) provide information to citizens on the government‘s performance. It was believed that this 
democratic reform would make the district heads more accountable to their constituencies (Kaiser, 
et al., 2005).  Based on the new Pilkada amendment, the government decided to conduct the first 
batch of direct elections in June 2005 in the districts where the DPRD heads were ending tenure. 
The first batch of direct elections concerned all the regional head positions that had come due 
between December 2004 and April 2005.
4 
Figure 1: Local Political-Accountability Transitions 
 
By June 2005, 155 districts had directly elected heads.  One important fact to note is the 
concurrent creation of new districts, or pemakaran.  From 2001 to 2007, the number of districts 
increased from just over 300 to 434, which also saw new district head positions opening up in the 
                                                       
4 If the tenure of any DPRD head was ending within the first few months of 2005, the government extended their terms 
up to May, 2005. 
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newly created child districts.  These district splits were more pronounced outside Java, in larger 
areas, as well as those that had significant resource endowments (Fitrani, et al., 2005).
5  Given that it 
is difficult to compare the spending structure and levels of districts affected by splits, our analysis 
focuses on those districts that are unaffected by splits.
6  By 2007, 304 out of a total of 434 districts – 
including ―undivided‖ and split districts -- had held direct elections.  Among the 264 districts that 
remained undivided between 2005 and 2007, 182 districts had held direct elections for district heads 
by 2007, including 77 that held their direct elections in June 2005 (Figure 3). All districts had been 
subject to direct elections by the end of 2009.  We define autocratic heads as those that were 
selected by the old DPRDs. 
Figure 2: Timing of direct elections of district 
heads in all 304 districts by 2007 
Figure 3: Timing of direct elections of district 
heads in 182 undivided districts by 2007 
 
Note: 304 districts out of 434 had a directly elected district head by 2007 
 
Note: 182 out of 264 undivided districts had a directly elected district 
head by 2007 
The timing of a direct election for undivided (and ―parent‖) local governments depended on 
when the five year term of the previous head had come to an end.  For example, if a district head 
was last elected in January 1999 under the New Order ―autocratic‖ selection process, (s)he would 
have been subject to indirect election by the 1999 elected DPRD in January 2004. Empirical analysis 
                                                       
5 Among the original 336 districts in 2001, 264 districts did not split during 2001-07. Fifty two districts split once and 20 
districts split twice or more during this six year period. 
6 Combining the newly split districts with each other would make them comparable in terms of geography and 
population with the ―old‖ district. However, governments of split districts are unlikely to behave the same way as the 
government of the old district would have if it had not been split, given that political, institutional and other factors that 
influence fiscal performance are likely to change as a result of the split. Furthermore, in many cases the parent districts 
continued with their existing government while the newly formed districts held direct elections. Combining the split 
districts may therefore lead to a mixing of different electoral regimes for the same district in the same time period, which 

































































































































































































indicates that whether a district had direct election by 2007 was determined by whether the tenure of 
the existing district head (bupati) was due to end by that time, and not correlated to a range of pre-
existing economic, social, and geographic characteristics of the district (see Annex A, Table A-1).
7  
Similarly, whether a district had indirect election was also determined by whether the tenure of the 
existing bupati was due to end between 1999 and 2004 and not by other district characteristics. These 
results support the claim that whether a district had direct elections or not in a certain year is 
exogenous for the purpose of our analysis, i.e. it is independent of district characteristics that can 
potentially influence public investment and outcomes. 
The identity of new district heads with the onset of democratic elections has also undergone 
a number of changes, although the literature notes a persistence of elites.  Local head elections are 
based on slates of district head and vice-head.  The structure of Pilkada elections is in effect first-
past-the post, meaning that even candidates with less than an outright majority can win if an election 
has multiple candidates.
8  A growing number of qualitative analysis have examined the particular 
local dynamics and identities of both winning and losing candidates (Brown and Diprose, 2007, Erb 
and Sulistiyanto, 2009).  
 
3.  Public Good Provision and Political Accountability 
A growing cross-country, as well as intra-country, literature has examined the relationship 
between political accountability and public good provision.  A significant cross-country literature has 
begun to emerge on associations between electoral mechanisms and economic policy, including 
aggregate public spending and debt levels (Persson and Tabellini, 2006).   A central concern of the 
literature has been whether governments are inclined to provide public goods that are responsive to 
broader citizens needs, versus more narrowly targeted ―private‖ goods or patronage.  The 
relationship between time-horizons and the incentives for politicians has figured prominently in this 
                                                       
7 In a probit regression of whether a district had direct election (as per Law No. 34/2004), the variable indicating 
whether the last government served full term before the direct election is highly statistically significant, whereas all other 
district level characteristics were insignificant. These include characteristics related to the economy (per capita GDP, 
unemployment, natural resources), urbanization, infrastructure (roads, telephone), physical characteristics 
(hilly/coastal/valley) and regional fixed effects. Similar results are also seen for a regression of whether a district has had 
indirect election (as per Law No. 22/1999). 
8 Candidates must be at least 32 years old, healthy, and endorsed by one or more parties that together received at least 15 
percent of the previous DPRD legislative vote of the 2004 and 2009 elections respectively. 10 
 
literature.  Especially for younger democracies in which politicians are not able to make credible 
longer term commitments to provide public goods, there would be a greater propensity to provide 
clientelistic expenditures (Keefer and Vlaicu, 2007).  Over time, this type of public spending will be 
less likely to result in improved development outcomes. 
Public investment, which is often loosely referred to as development expenditures, has been 
one area of focus for this literature.  In developing countries this type of expenditure is seen as 
critical to supporting basic service delivery indicators, but also as a source of significant rent 
distribution.  For example, Keefer and Knack (2007) find that higher public investment is associated 
with more limited checks and balances.
9  Delavallade (2006) suggests that higher country corruption 
appears to distort spending away from social expenditures (health, education, social protection) 
toward other public services, fuel, and energy.  She argues that this indicates that social sectors may 
offer less opportunity for embezzlement.  De la Croix and Delavallde (2009) develop a model and 
empirical test to show that more predatory/rent-seeking governments invest more in housing and 
physical capital than in health and education. 
The literature on local government is rife with examples of poor political accountability, and 
a focus on ―jobs for the boys‖, rather than services for the people.  Drawing on the infamous 
example of James Michael Curley, a four-time mayor of Boston, Glaesser and Schleifer (2005) show 
how he used wasteful redistribution to his poor Irish constituents and incendiary rhetoric to 
encourage richer citizens to emigrate from Boston, thereby shaping the electorate in his favor.  Many 
residents of Washington, DC in the 1970s and 1980s would have felt similarly as their city was 
driven into bankruptcy.  As a consequence, Boston stagnated, but Curley kept winning elections. 
Their model illustrates how using redistributive politics can help to shape the electorate. The  model 
yields a number of predictions that contradict those from more standard frameworks of political 
competition, but consistent with empirical evidence.  
The example of Bolivia‘s decentralization to the municipal level in the 1990s provides some 
evidence that local governments were more responsive than centrally led allocation to local needs.  
Faguet (2004) is able to document this by a careful comparison of shifts in local expenditure 
priorities relative to indicators of local need.  Tsai (2007) provides a fascinating account of how 
informal mechanisms, including links with local temple groups, are associated with local leaders 
                                                       
9 They do note that governments may be attempting to compensate for weaker private investment, 11 
 
providing public goods such as roads and schools.  Zhang et. al. (2004) analyze the impact of the 
introduction of local elections to some of China‘s villages.  They find that the introduction of 
electoral accountability does not increase the level of revenue mobilization, but shifts it from 
individuals to enterprises. 
The literature suggests that increased democratic accountability and the direct election of 
regional heads could have a number of implications for policy choices by government. First, a shift 
to direct elections holds the promise to increase political accountability to the broader electorate.  
This would make governments more responsive to local needs.  Second, directly accountable heads 
would be expected to spend more on aggregate, either through decreasing savings or increasing 
borrowing.  Impacts on own-source revenue generation are expected to be ambiguous, given not 
only the pressures to increase expenditures but also the political pain of increasing taxes on the local 
population.  Expectations about relative levels of development versus routine spending are highly 
contingent on whether one views one type of spending as more or less of a rent distribution 
mechanism than the other.  Third, the shift to direct elections may trigger shifts in the policy choices 
and spending of incumbent district heads who were indirectly appointed in this position and who 
have ambitions to get re-elected in office through spending that is directed to better or more 
services. 
4.  Data and Empirical Methodology  
We first examine whether direct election for the district government (Pilkada) in Indonesia 
has led to changes in the allocation and distribution of public resources by making the government 
more accountable to its citizens. This involves isolating the changes in resource mobilization and 
investment resulting from direct election. We use a difference-in-difference (DID) approach to measure 
the impact, utilizing the ―natural experiment‖ element of how direct elections were implemented, 
where the timing of when a district holds direct elections was determined by when the previous 
district head‘s tenure was due to end. We also examine the heterogeneity of the impacts of Pilkada 
along a few key dimensions, by looking at whether and how the impacts are different across districts 
that are headed by incumbents or new entrants, and across districts that are geographically different 
(those in Java and Bali versus those outside). Finally, we examine the question that if direct election 
did bring change, are these changes consistent with (or responsive to) the (measurable) needs of the 12 
 
district? To identify the drivers of changes in investment, we propose a simple, intuitive model and 
use regressions to empirically estimate its reduced form. 
For the first part of the exercise, the impacts are measured primarily on only a few fiscal 
variables: expenditures (total and by sector), revenues from own sources, and budget deficit. On the 
expenditure side, we focus on public investments in all eight sectors for which the district 
governments make decisions on investments, with special emphasis on health and education that are 
likely to have the most direct impact on human development outcomes. The primary reason for 
including expenditure indicators is that higher expenditures on basic public services, on the average, 
are likely to be an early indicator for a better performing or more responsive local government. 
While higher expenditures are no guarantee for actual improvements in public services, improving 
availability and quality of services more often than not requires additional investment. Expenditures 
are especially likely to indicate better performance among local governments in the Indonesian 
context, where the recent fiscal decentralization is likely to have increased the amount of resources 
at the disposal of local governments. Higher spending on public services is therefore likely to 
indicate more readiness on the part of a local government to utilize the available resources.  
Local government financing is composed of a limited own-source revenue base, which 
represents on average less than a tenth of total revenues.  Local governments are highly dependent 
on central transfers, notably a block grant (DAU); natural resource revenue sharing—which is 
particularly important for a number of districts outside of Java; revenue sharing from income and 
property taxes--a source of revenue which is especially important for urban districts; and other 
sources of revenue.
10  Local governments are able to engage in some borrowing, and also build up 
cash reserves (Lewis, 2005, 2007).  Aggregate spending decisions are therefore contingent on own-
source revenue base and effort, central transfer allocations, and savings/borrowing decisions.  
The primary reason for including revenue generation from own sources in the analysis is that 
it allows us to investigate the relationship between democratic reforms and own revenue generation. 
Some of the literature on the subject appears to suggest an inverse relationship – in a democracy in a 
developing country, since the median voter is usually poor, the government would like to commit to 
low levels of future taxation. District level governments have very little control over the remaining 
sources of revenue. Tax rates, for example, are determined by the central authorities and not district 
                                                       
10 A specific grant (DAK) is also established in the intergovernmental fiscal system, but its role has been limited to-date. 13 
 
governments, although, in principle, district authorities could increase tax revenue by intensifying 
efforts to collect revenue at the local level or through more effective negotiation with the central 
authorities. Also, at the district level, the DAU block grant is the largest source of revenue for most 
districts,
 11 and its allocation is based on a formula aiming to address disparities between local 
expenditures needs and local own fiscal potential (Hofman et al. 2006).  
We also examine the impact of the electoral reform on the budget deficit of the district. For 
our analysis, surplus is defined as the simple difference between total revenue and total expenditures 
at the district level. Total revenue is defined as the sum of revenues from own sources, revenue from 
tax sharing with the center, revenue from of non-tax (i.e. natural resource) revenue sharing with 
center, the block grants (DAU and DAK) and revenue from other sources. 
Measuring the impact of direct elections on public investments, revenue and budget deficit. 
We focus on the post fiscal decentralization period – between 2001 and 2006 – considering 
direct election for local government (Law No. 34/2004) in a district as the ―treatment‖ whose 
impact needs to be analyzed.  The fiscal variables on which we expect to see an impact are from the 
years 2001-2006; the first round of direct election in 155 districts took place in June 2005 and 48 
more had elections in the successive quarters in 2005. Thus, we choose the end of 2005 as the 
switching point between ―pre‖ and ―post‖ Pilkada periods, which implies that our dataset includes 
observations from both pre- and post-direct election periods. We define those districts as 
―treatment‖ where direct election had occurred in 2005, while the control districts are those that did 
not have direct elections until 2008 or later. This also implies that districts that had direct election in 
2006 or 2007 are omitted from the regressions altogether. Omitting these from the regression 
sample is justified in our view because they can arguably belong to either the treatment or control 
groups and are therefore likely to bias the measured impacts of direct elections (see section 5 for 
more discussion of this issue). 
We use the following model to identify the impact of direct election: 
                                         
                    (1) 
                                                       
11 In 2004, for example, DAU accounted for an average of 64 percent of total revenues. 14 
 
The dependent variable     represents a fiscal variable of interest – including the revenues 
from own sources, the different components of realized expenditure and budget surplus/deficit – 
for district m at time t (2001 to 2006). By construction, the binary variable   takes the value 1 if 
district m is in the treatment group (i.e. direct elections were held in the district between June and 
December 2005) and equal to 0 otherwise. The binary variable     takes the value 1 for post 
Pilkada years (2006) and 0 otherwise (2001-2005), while     denotes the district fixed-effect 
summarizing the role of all observable and unobservable variables at the district level that do not 
vary over time. The disturbance term     summarizes the influence of all other unobserved 
variables that vary across districts and over time, assumed to be uncorrelated with the variables in 
the regression, though it is allowed to be correlated over time. In this framework, the parameter   
then identifies the effect of any systemic difference between the treatment and control groups of 
districts on the dependent variable in the pre-Pilkada reference year (i.e. 2001).  The parameters      
identify the ―year effect‖ on the dependent variable, namely the effect of any systemic changes that 
affected all districts in the pre-Pilkada years. The parameter   is the parameter of our interest since 
this identifies the difference-in-differences (or DID) of the impact of direct election on the dependent 
variable.
12   
Specifically, the DID estimate of the impact of Pilkada provides an estimate of the average 
change in the outcome variable   in the treated group from pre-Pilkada (denoted by the subscript 
preE) to post-Pilkada years (denoted by the subscript postE) relative to changes in outcome variable 
in the control group over the same period of time, i.e.,  
                                                           .        (2) 
Data 
To conduct the analysis, we assemble a large dataset, compiled from multiple sources and 
linked at the district level. These are regional electoral information from the government (Ministry 
of Home Affairs, MoHA), and regional budget data from SIKD for the period 2001 to 2006. 
The district-level electoral information from the government has been compiled by the 
Jakarta World Bank team with the collaboration of the Ministry of Home Affairs and a number of 
                                                       
12 The specification of (1) follows closely what is suggested by the literature on the use of DID method for impact 
evaluation. See, for example, Imbens and Wooldridge (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009) (2009), pp. 67-70. 15 
 
local institutions.
13 The data set contains information for the period 1999 to 2007 on how the 
current district head was selected (e.g. by pre-1999 DPRDs, indirect elections by post-1999 DPRDs,  
direct elections, or whether (s)he is a caretaker head  appointed by the central government until the 
next elections), the name of the elected district head, whether (s)he was preceded by a caretaker 
district head, whether the incumbent governor won or ran in the elections, the reason for the 
incumbent governor not contending, the share of votes won, the number of candidates , the political 
party, the date the term began and ends and some key personal characteristics such as gender, and 
whether (s)he is in the military. 
The SIKD regional budget data from 2001 to 2006 was derived from MoF‘s Regional 
Financial Information System (Sistem Informasi Keuangan Daerah, SIKD).
14 The Fiscal Year within this 
time span runs from January to December.  The introduction of a ―new‖ budget format according 
to MoHA Decree no. 29/2002 changed the budget structure since 2003, with the changes mostly 
affecting the classifications on the expenditure side.
15  To enable comparison over time, we 
converted the new dataset into the old format as per SIKD guidelines – by mapping the post-2003 
expenditure data into the old categories of development and routine expenditures. To measure 
changes in real terms, we also deflated the fiscal data for 2001 to 2006 using 2000 as the base year. 
The changes in fiscal variables over time and across treatment and control districts estimated 
in more detail by the regressions can be seen clearly from graphs showing trends for different 
groups.  Figure 4 traces the averages of selected fiscal variables over time and separately for 
treatment and control groups. An implicit assumption behind the application of the DID estimator 
is that the time trend (or year effect) is identical between the treatment and control groups in the 
years prior to the elections. The graphs in figure 4 suggest that the assumption of common trends 
between the treatment and control groups prior to the elections (2001-2005) is justified, a fact that 
has also been confirmed by a variety of statistical tests. Average per capita total expenditure and 
                                                       
13 Special thanks go to Bambang Suharnoko (WB), Anstasia Soeryadinata and W. Paul Roland (NDI Indonesia), Natalia 
Warat, and Jeremy Gross (Asia Foundation). 
14 SIKD is a facility provided by the Ministry of Finance to collect, validate, process, and analyze regional financial 
information. Regional governments have the legal obligation to report this data to the M inistry of Finance in a timely 
manner. 
15 Before 2003, there were only two categories- revenues and expenditures with expenditure classified as either routine 
(recurrent) or development (investment). From 2003, the classification on the expenditure side changed from ―routine‖ 
and  ―development‖  expenditures  to  ―public‖  and  ―apparatus‖  expenditures.  The  other  change  introduced  was  the 
separation of ―financing‖ item from revenue and expenditure categories.  Approximately 60 percent of all regions used 
the new budget format for the 2003 realizations, while 40 percent continued to use the old format. By 2004, 90 percent 
of regions were using the new budget format. 16 
 
revenue show a sharp increase from 2005 to 2006 for treatment and control groups alike – in 
contrast to nearly flat expenditures and revenues during 2001-2005. The increase is however larger 
for the treatment group, suggesting a possibly significant impact of direct elections.
16 While both 
education and health expenditures increase between 2005 and 2006, the impact of direct elections 
appears to be more significant for education than for health. Lastly, the two graphs at the bottom 
suggest that direct elections also appear to be associated with an increase in the revenue from own 
sources (PAD) and a substantial increase in the fiscal surplus.
17  
Figure 4: Changes in selected district level fiscal variables over time 
 
 Note: 1)The solid lines represent the treatment group and the dashed lines the control group  
2) Vertical axes represent per capita real expenditure and revenue in  ‗000 rupiah  
                                                       
16 Similar trends are also observed for average development expenditures and routine expenditures, and for expenditures 
in education and health over time and across treatment and control groups. 
17 In 2006 the formula used to allocate the DAU block grant to d istricts, which makes up the bulk of the district 
revenues, was revised substantially resulting to substantial increases in district revenues(for more details see World Bank, 
2007, pp.120-121.) 17 
 
 
5.  The Impact of Direct Elections: Difference in Difference Estimates 
In the regressions estimating the DID impacts (see equation (1) above), the dependent 
variable is a specific expenditure or revenue-related variable for district m at time t. The independent 
variable T takes the value 1 when the observation pertains to a district that held a direct election by 
end-2005 (treatment) and 0 when the district had no direct election (control) as of 2007. As 
discussed earlier, the sample is restricted to observations from the districts that remained undivided 
between till 2006, leaving 112 treatment districts and 122 control districts, covering the period 2001-
2006. We have also omitted from the sample the districts that had direct elections in 2006 or 2007, 
which implies that the set of control districts consists of districts that did not hold local direct 
elections until 2008 and later.
18. In light of the concerns raised by Bertrand et al (2004) about the 
reliability of the standard error estimate of the DID estimate of impact, we take into account the 
potential serial correlation in the error term     assuming a parametric autocorrelation structure 
using the method proposed by Baltagi and Wu (1999) for unbalanced panels.
19   
Our DID estimates (summarized by the parameter  ) indicate that per capita total 
expenditures in districts with direct elections in 2005 have increased significantly from the pre- to 
post-Pilkada period relative to districts that did not have direct election, suggesting that having a 
direct election in a district had a positive and significant impact on expenditures of district 
governments (Table 1a). Looking at expenditures disaggregated by sector, the DID estimate is at 
least weakly significant (10 percent level or stronger) for 4 out of 8 sectors. Public works, 
transportation, health, and industry are the sectors for which direct elections had no impact on 
expenditures. 
Tables 1a and 1b 
The positive impact on government expenditure is attributable to increases in both 
development and routine expenditures, but with their relative importance varying from sector to 
                                                       
18 Later in the paper, we also investigate whether the districts that had local elections in 2007 and 2006 (the last year of 
our data on district-level expenditures and revenues) differ on average in terms of revenue and expenditure allocations 
from the districts in the control group, i.e. the districts that had local elections in 2008 or later. 
19 In general, the standard errors estimated based on fixed effects model with an AR(1) disturbance where higher than 
the standard errors estimated with a simple fixed effect model ignoring the potential serial correlation in the error term.  18 
 
sector (see Table 1a). Routine expenditure refers to expenditures related to general administration, 
including expenses on personnel, goods, and official travel, and repayment on borrowing and 
interest. Development expenditures refer primarily to expenditures on O&M (operations and 
maintenance) and capital spending. The impact of direct election is positive and significant on both 
aggregate development and routine expenditures.  
Disaggregating by sector, we find that the significant increase in education and industry 
sector expenditures is attributable to increases in routine expenditures in these sectors. In contrast; 
the increases in administration, agriculture and housing expenditures are driven by both development 
and routine expenditures. The story that emerges on expenditures in the key sectors of health and 
education is as follows. The increase in education expenditures was significantly larger in districts 
where direct elections were held, mainly due to increases in routine (as opposed to development) 
expenditures, relative to districts without direct election. In the case of health expenditures, 
however, districts with direct elections did not have a significantly larger increase relative to the rest. 
Direct elections therefore seemed to have an impact on routine expenditures in education, but not 
on health expenditures of any type. 
The DID estimates indicate that direct elections had a positive and significant impact on the 
real per capita revenue from own sources of district governments.
20 Moreover, the budget surplus in 
per capita terms (defined here as the simple difference between total revenues and expenditures of 
the district government) in treatment districts increased after the direct elections in comparison to 
the control districts (Table 1b).  
In sum, the positive impact of direct elections on expenditures appears to have been spread 
across sectors, with 4 out of 8 sectors showing at least weakly significant impact. The impact is 
strongly significant for the key service delivery sector of education (but not for health), where 
increase in routine (as opposed to development) expenditures is the driving force. Since the increase 
in expenditures is spread across a number of sectors, direct elections do not seem to have led to 
significant shifts in the allocations of spending across sectors (see Annex, Table A-2a and 2b).  
                                                       
20 One important caveat for the interpretation of these results is that the reported revenue from own sources (PAD) in 
the SIKD data base is zero in 2004 and 2005. We have been unable to establish the reasons behind the absence of any 
revenues in these two years. 19 
 
Rather surprisingly, in the immediate aftermath of the reform in Indonesia, we do find a 
positive and significant impact of democratic reform on the amount of revenue generated from own 
sources by the district governments. This result is contrary to the inverse relationship between own 
sources of revenue and electoral reforms suggested by the literature cited in Section 2. The 
statistically significant increase in the fiscal surplus also appears to contradict the prevailing notion in 
the decentralization literature that fiscal deficits at the district level are likely to increase based on the 
expectation that they will be absorbed by the central government.  
Java and Bali vs. Other Regions 
The analysis so far has focused on the average impact of Pilkada on the level of fiscal 
expenditures and revenues by districts. The wide diversity of Indonesia in geography, culture, 
ethnicity and religion warrants further investigation on the extent to which there is heterogeneity in 
the impacts of Pilkada. For this purpose, equation (1) is estimated separately for the group of 
districts that had direct elections in the Java and Bali region and the group districts that had direct 
election in the other regions (Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara, Maluku and Papua). 
Of the 174 districts in total for which we have expenditure and revenue data in 2006, about 53 
percent (or 92 districts) are not in the Java and Bali islands and about 61 percent of these (or 56 
districts) have directly elected heads.  Each of these two groups of districts is compared against the 
set of districts that did not have direct elections as of 2007 (irrespective of the region that 
comparison districts belong to).
21  A closer investigation of whether the impact of Pilkada varies by 
region can shed light on an important question:  In the geographic areas that benefitted the most, at 
least in terms of revenue, from the fiscal decentralization that started in 2001, is it the case that 
having elected local leaders led to greater impacts on expenditure (compared to having district heads 
who were not elected)?  For example, in 2002, approximately three-quarters of the total natural 
resource revenue was distributed to the district governments in the provinces of Aceh, Riau, East 
Kalimantan and Papua (Lewis, 2005). It is also the case that the fiscal decentralization was, in part, 
motivated by secessionist sentiments and centrifugal tendencies in a number of the outlying 
provinces like Aceh, and Papua.  
Table 2a and 2b 
                                                       
21 We have also estimated an interaction model on the full sample of the treatment and control districts by allowing the 
treatment (Pilkada) effect to differ between districts in the Java and Bali islands and the districts in the outer islands. 
These comparable estimates are available directly from the authors upon request.  20 
 
The estimates in Table 2a reveal that the trajectories of district government expenditures and 
revenues in post-Pilkada years are quite different depending on the geographic location of the 
district. DID estimates of the impact of direct elections on expenditures per capita in the districts 
outside Java and Bali are qualitatively similar to, and more pronounced than, the impact of direct 
elections in the pooled sample of districts. Total per capita expenditures in the districts outside Java 
and Bali increased significantly from pre- to post-Pilkada period relative to the control districts. 
Moreover, seven out of 8 sectors show significant impact of local elections on expenditures, with 
transport being the only sector where there is no impact.  In contrast, in the districts located in the 
islands of Java and Bali, total per capita expenditures decreased significantly relative to the control 
districts and the decrease seems to be more or less uniform across sectors. The higher expenditures 
in the districts outside Java and Bali that had direct elections are also accompanied by an increase in 
revenues from own sources and an increase in the budget surplus. In contrast, the districts that had 
direct elections within Java and Bali, do not display any significant difference in the trajectories of 
revenues from own sources or budget surplus from those in the comparison group (Table 2b).  
Incumbents vs. non-Incumbents 
Another potential source of heterogeneity in the choice of local expenditures, revenues, and 
fiscal balance may be the incumbency status of the elected district head. As mentioned earlier, 
district heads that were indirectly appointed by the local parliaments prior to 2004 were allowed to 
run for re-election with many of the incumbents getting elected to continue in office. For example, 
in 2006, out of the 174 districts in our data, 57 percent (or 100 districts) held indirect elections in 
2005 and in just over a half of these districts (53 percent) the incumbent district heads were re-
elected. The political business cycle literature from industrialized countries suggests that incumbent 
politicians are likely to manipulate government expenditures to either enhance their probability of 
re-election or for the purpose of rewarding the groups that supported them after their re-election 
(Alesina et al. 1997; Drazen, 2000).  
To shed some light on this question, equation (1) is estimated separately for the group of 
districts where the elected head was an incumbent prior to the 2005 local election and the group of 
districts where the elected head was a non-incumbent. Each of these two groups of districts is 
compared against the set of control districts, i.e. the districts that did not have direct elections as of 21 
 
2007.
22  DID estimates of the impact of Pilkada on expenditures reported in Table 3a reveal that the 
results in the pooled sample (Table 1a) are driven mainly by the districts where non-incumbents are 
elected. Per capita total expenditures in the districts with non-incumbents increased significantly 
from pre- to post-Pilkada period relative to the control districts. Six out of eight sectors show a 
significant impact of local elections on expenditures, with public works and transport being the only 
sectors in which there is no impact. In contrast, the comparison of the trajectories of total 
expenditures in districts where incumbents were elected are not significantly different from the 
trajectories of expenditures in the control districts. 
23 Also, for the sectors where there appears to 
have been a significant increase in expenditures, the size of the increase is much lower than the 
expenditure increase in the districts where non incumbents were elected.  
The increased expenditures in the districts where non-incumbents were elected also appear 
to be accompanied by significant increases in the revenues from own sources (Table 3b). While both 
groups of districts with direct elections experienced a significant increase in budget surplus, it is only 
in the group of districts where non-incumbents were elected that we observed a significant increase 
in revenue from own sources, consistent with a more fiscally responsible behavior on the part of the 
government.  
Tables 3a and 3b 
Overall, the preceding estimates suggest that the positive effects of the 2004/2005 electoral 
reforms on the district expenditures are due mainly to (i) the increases in expenditures in the districts 
outside Java and Bali; and (ii) the changes in expenditures brought about by the non-incumbents 
elected in the districts. The finding that being directly elected had little or no impact on the spending 
of a district head who is an incumbent (the previous district head) has two plausible explanations – 
that direct elections actually had no impact for incumbents, or that expenditures had already been 
manipulated prior to the election to improve their chance of re-election. The second explanation 
seems unlikely--incumbents in the 2005 elections did not have much of a chance to manipulate the 
                                                       
22 We have also estimated equation (1) limited to the sample of the 100 districts that had direct elections in 2005. In 
almost all categories of expenditures, the trajectories of the expenditures of the incumbents are significantly lower than 
the trajectories of expenditures in the districts were non-incumbents were elected. These estimates are available upon 
request from the authors. 
23 We also checked whether the exp enditures of incumbents in 2005, the year of the election, were higher than the 
corresponding expenditures in districts where non-incumbents were elected. We found that in 2005 the expenditures on 
public works is the only category of expenditures higher th an the expenditures in districts where non-incumbents were 
elected.  22 
 
spending of district governments since the electoral reform law was passed in late 2004 and elections 
started taking place less than six months after that. Thus, the likely story appears to be that the 
reforms induced a change in incentives and performance (as proxied by spending) primarily when 
the elections yielded a change in leadership, and not when the previous district head came back as 
the elected head.   
Expectations of Pilkada  
The analysis so far excludes districts that had direct elections in 2006 or 2007 (70 districts) 
from the regressions. It is important, however, to examine the extent to which the anticipation of 
having local elections in the current or the next year affects the spending and revenue allocations of 
the current district administration.  The availability of information on district level expenditures and 
revenues in 2006, the year after local direct elections begun to be implemented in some districts, 
allows us to examine whether having direct elections in the current year (2006) or the expectation of 
elections in the next year (in 2007) is associated with any differences in the level of district 
expenditures and the sources of revenues, compared to the districts  that are scheduled to have 
direct elections in later years (i.e. in 2008 and after).  Some authors argue that manipulation of 
expenditures and policies for the purposes of re-election is more likely to occur after direct elections 
at the local level have been in place for a while (e.g. Khemani, 2004; Grier and Grier, 2000). 
Following the legislation and the implementation of the electoral reform in a number of districts in 
2005, it is quite plausible that the incumbents in the districts where direct elections are about to take 
place change their expenditures and policy choices so as to increase their chances of re-election. 
Empirical evidence of significant changes in fiscal expenditures in the districts facing direct elections 
in the near future (current or next year) as opposed to 2-3 years later, would suggest that there is a 
―Pilkada anticipation effect‖ at work in these districts.  
The available literature also provides some interesting insights about the effect of elections 
on policy choices. Khemani (2004), for example, argues that close to election time, politicians are 
less likely to use broad-based tax cuts and more likely to provide targeted benefits to voters in 
exchange for political support during election time.  
Tables 4a and 4b 23 
 
To examine these issues, we re-estimate equation (1) by re-defining the treatment group as 
the group of districts that was left out of the earlier analysis because this group held direct elections 
in 2006 or 2007. The set of comparison districts used is identical to that used in the earlier 
regressions, i.e. the districts that did not have direct elections until 2008 and later. The estimates in 
Table 4a reveal that the fiscal expenditure trajectories of the districts where direct elections are 
taking place (i.e. 2006) or are about to take place are very similar to the fiscal expenditure trajectories 
of the districts that already held had local elections in 2005 and have a locally elected district head in 
place (see Table 1a). Total expenditures as well as development and routine expenditures are higher 
than in the control districts. In accordance with the patterns observed in other countries such as 
India, the anticipation of elections in a district is associated with a significantly higher level of per 
capita development expenditures, the category of spending that is particularly ―targetable‖ and more 
discretionary. In addition, in the districts where elections are imminent the spending on public works 
programs appears to constitute the major component of the (higher) development expenditures, 
which implies that development spending on public works is the natural instrument for ―buying 
support‖ from the broader public. Contrary to expectations, revenues from own sources are also 
higher in these districts as is overall surplus, which suggests that the anticipation of district elections 
is not sufficient to deter current district heads from raising revenues, or at least intensifying efforts 
toward raising revenues from own sources (Table 4b).  
6.  Are the Changes in Expenditures Based on Need?  
As acknowledged above, the estimated impacts of electoral reforms on district expenditures 
are only a necessary condition for the impacts of increased accountability on service delivery. One 
critical question is whether the shift to electoral accountability results in improvements in the 
measured outcomes of service delivery. In Annex B we investigate this issue and find no significant 
impacts on outcomes. One possible explanation for the absence of any measurable impacts on 
outcomes is the fact that we only have two years of data (2006 and 2007) on outcome indicators 
after the initiation of the electoral reforms. Two years is by all accounts too short of a time horizon 
in which to expect measurable impacts, even if electoral reforms are ultimately successful at 
improving outcomes. We can, however, examine whether expenditures in districts that had direct 
elections are more responsive to the ―needs‖ of districts.  Expenditures being responsive to unmet 
needs for services would not necessarily imply that outcomes would improve, but make it more likely 
that they would, in comparison to a situation in which investments are uncorrelated with needs.     24 
 
For this purpose, we estimate the regression  
                                          ,            (3) 
where the dependent variable is the difference between pre- and post- direct election local 
government expenditures,    denotes the vector of the initial stock of public goods,     is a vector 
of indicators summarizing the initial economic conditions in the district, political and institutional 
environment and history of previous governments, and   and   are the vectors of coefficients of the 
preceding vectors of variables. To normalize for price differences and population, we consider 
investments in real and per capita terms.  
The main coefficient of interest is given by the vector  , which can be interpreted as an 
indication of  the extent to which investment is based on need (as in Faguet, 2004). Following 
Faguet, two types of information are used as indicators of the stock of public services, PG0: (a) the 
initial per capita stock of infrastructure (before Pilkada), and (b) the ―coverage rates‖ of public 
services or benefits in the local population. For education, for example, (a) would include number of 
school facilities of different types in a district, prior to electoral reform; examples of (b) would be 
school enrollment and completion rates, distance to school, and years of education among the 
population. The status of physical facilities is important because unmet needs in infrastructure or 
facilities are usually the most visible and likely to be addressed through public investments. Type (b) 
variables indicate the composite result of a combination of factors, including (but not limited to) 
availability, usage, and utility from public investment for citizens in a district.  
A negative and significant coefficient on     would suggest that after political 
decentralization a district government invests more heavily in a sector when public goods in that 
sector are scarce and therefore the demand for public goods is higher. A significantly positive 
coefficient would imply that after political decentralization, investment increases with the pre-
existing level of services, possibly accentuating pre-existing differences in public goods endowments 
amongst municipalities. The coefficients of the variables in    , summarized by the vector  , can 
provide useful insights into the economic, institutional and historic determinants of a local 
government‘s investment decisions. These factors are likely to have influenced how the investment 
decisions of the district government evolved since fiscal decentralization (see Faguet 2004). If 
political decentralization actually led to greater political accountability and sensitivity to citizens‘ 25 
 
preferences, how these changes translate into investment decisions is then likely to be influenced by 
the same set of economic, political and institutional factors.  
We are primarily interested in identifying the factors that explain the increase in expenditures 
between pre- and post-Pilkada periods in the districts that belong to the treatment groups most 
relevant for our analysis – districts that held direct elections in 2005. However, for the purpose of 
comparison, we also report the estimates of the same regression on the sample of the districts that 
did not have direct elections until 2008 and later, i.e. the districts used as a comparison group thus 
far. The explanatory variables used in the analysis are obtained from the Village Potential series 
(PODES) and the National Socio-Economic Survey (SUSENAS) both administered by Central 
Bureau of Statistics‘ (BPS). The PODES is a village census that collects detailed information every 
three years on a range of characteristics – ranging from infrastructure to village finance – for all of 
Indonesia‘s villages and neighborhoods (about 69,000). The survey is implemented by sub-district 
level statistical agents, who work for BPS, and information is typically provided by the village heads 
and neighborhood heads. The SUSENAS survey is an annual household survey covering around 
205,000 households from all over Indonesia that is representative at the district (Kabupaten) level. 
The survey collects household level data, such as household age and gender composition, 
consumption expenditures in major food and non-food categories, as well as individual level data, 
including school attendance and educational attainment, use of health facilities, participation in the 
labor market, earnings and fertility-related questions for women. 
The dependent variables in the regressions are the difference between post- and pre- Pilkada 
expenditures (total, development and routine) for education, health and all sectors combined and 
budget deficit for all sectors combined.
24 Education and health sectors are considered separately 
given that these represent key public services that are likely to matter for human development 
outcomes. Even though no treatment effect (of direct elections) is found for health expenditures, 
these are still important to analyze separately since average health expenditure for all districts 
increased between pre- and post-Pilkada periods (see Figure 4 and Table 1). We do not attempt to 
conduct a separate analysis for other sectors (e.g. transport, agriculture, housing) since information 
on the pre-decentralization status of public services in these sectors is not available.  
                                                       
24 Actually, the dependent variable is (expenditures in 2006 - average expenditures during the period 2001-05).  26 
 
Among the independent variables, a number of indicators capture the status of public 
services in education and health in the district prior to decentralization (in or before 2001). These 
include the actual stock of facilities such as the number of different types of schools, health facilities 
and doctors; and the coverage rate of public services, proxied by enrollment and attendance rates, 
access to nearest facilities, years of education for the population, proportion of births attended by 
health professionals, and proportion of outpatients in public health facilities. The vector     includes 
variables that capture the initial economic and fiscal conditions of the district, namely the poverty 
rate, per capita real GDP of the district and total expenditure of DPRD in 2001, an index of 
industrialization, political and institutional conditions, proxied by a political fragmentation index 
(2004), the size of bureaucracy and wage bill of civil servants, and variables related to corruption and 
its coverage by the media (see Annex C for detailed description of variables).
25  A rural/urban 
dummy and dummies for the different regions (islands) are added to allow for spatial differences. 
Table 5 
The full set of regression estimates can be found in Annex C, Tables C1-C3. Table 5 
summarizes the regressions estimates for the main variables of interest. Overall, we do not find any 
strong evidence that in the districts that had direct elections, the changes in expenditures of district 
governments from pre- to post-direct election periods are responsive to the observable needs of 
districts (Table 5). It should be noted, that at least the results do not suggest a perverse relationship, 
which is to say higher investment in districts with lower need. Change in education expenditures, for 
example, is negatively correlated with the initial stock of senior high schools in the district, 
suggesting some responsiveness to the educational needs of a district. However, almost all of the 
other indicators for the pre-decentralization status of public services in education or health are 
insignificant as determinants of change in expenditures.  
Political and institutional factors have some influence on changes in expenditures from pre- 
to post-Pilkada period, and more frequently so in the districts that had direct elections than in the 
districts that did not. However, the implications of these coefficients are unclear. The change in 
health expenditures is smaller when the extent of political fragmentation, size of bureaucracy and 
incidence of corruption cases are lower in the district. Size of bureaucracy and corruption also 
                                                       
25 Access  to schools and health facilities and level  of industrialization are proxied  by  principal component indices 
constructed from multiple variables (see Annex C, Table C-3 for a description of each index). 27 
 
influence the change in education and total expenditures in the same direction. DPRD expenditures 
and real per capita GDP of the district in the pre-decentralization period (2001) have a strong 
influence on sectoral and total expenditures. Expenditures on health and education increase more 
for districts that were richer and had higher DPRD expenditures before decentralization started.  
The role of the above factors in explaining expenditure trends, while less relevant to our 
primary question of whether expenditures are responsive to needs, hints at interesting relationships 
that merit future research. The inverse relationship seen between expenditure increases, and size of 
bureaucracy and incidence of corruption, indirectly implies that higher post-Pilkada expenditures in 
treatment districts may not have led to greater corruption and inefficiencies.  On the other hand, the 
strong positive relationship between increase in expenditures, and the initial value of district 
government expenditure and district GDP, suggests a path dependency of fiscal outcomes. This may 
imply that any pre-existing inefficiencies in expenditures and inequities in the allocation of public 
resources (favoring better-off districts) would have persisted in the post-Pilkada period as well. 
Thus, after controlling for the role played by economic, political and institutional factors, we 
do not find any strong evidence that district government expenditures in education and health 
correlate with the status of public services in a district. The direction of correlations is consistent 
with the proposition that the increase in expenditures in districts where direct elections were held, 
from pre- to post- Pilkada periods, was in part responsive to the needs of citizens. However, the 
degree of responsiveness appears to be small, both in terms of the number of indicators that 
influence expenditure trends and the size of the effects, and overshadowed by the effects of the pre-
existing economic condition and expenditures of the districts. 
7.  Conclusions 
Our results suggest that electoral reforms that promote grassroots democracy did make a 
difference in the way local governments function in Indonesia. The reforms, which introduced direct 
elections to elect district government heads in a phased manner, raised the district governments‘ 
performance in terms of spending. While average expenditures and revenues of district governments 
increased between 2005 and 2006 when all districts are considered, districts in which direct elections 
were held experienced an additional and significant increase in expenditures and revenues. Also, 28 
 
revenues outpaced spending, with the result that the net impact was a widening (shrinking) of the 
budget surplus (deficit) as a result of the reform. 
Our analysis also suggests that electoral reforms led to higher revenue generation from own 
sources. A priori (as argued in Section 3), we were ambiguous about the direction of the impact of 
direct elections on own source revenue generation, due to the competing effects of the need to 
increase expenditures on the one hand and the political difficulty of increasing local taxes on the 
other. That we find revenues from own sources increasing in the districts with directly elected heads 
seems to suggest that the former effect dominates in the case of Pilkada. The idea that local 
politicians may reduce local tax raising efforts to increase their chances of re-election is also 
contradicted by our finding that revenue from own sources increases even in the case of districts with 
local elections in the near horizon (1-2 years away). These results, along with the findings of positive 
impacts on budget surplus, seem to suggest that increased electoral accountability for local 
governments was associated with a more prudent approach to fiscal balances even as spending 
increased.    
Given the sequencing of reforms in Indonesia, our findings can be seen as the effects of 
political decentralization in a setting where the legal and institutional framework of fiscal 
decentralization was already in place. By isolating the impact of political decentralization in the form 
of electoral reforms from other aspects of decentralization, our analysis complements a recent paper 
that finds positive impact of decentralization on the investments and responsiveness of local 
governments (Faguet, 2004 for Bolivia). The unique features and sequencing of political 
decentralization in Indonesia also allows us to derive robust estimates of impact using a quasi-
experimental evaluation method, which is typically not possible for most countries in which such 
reforms have occurred on a large scale.   
A further investigation of the heterogeneity of the impacts of the electoral reform on district 
expenditures and deficits revealed that the overall positive effect of electoral reforms on public 
spending was primarily due to the increases in expenditures in the districts outside Java and Bali and 
the changes in expenditure brought about by the non-incumbents (as opposed to incumbents or a 
previous district heads) elected in the districts. The latter finding suggests that the reform influenced 
the spending performance of district heads primarily when the elections resulted in a change in 
leadership, and had little or no impact when an incumbent came back as the elected district head.      29 
 
The results also suggest that the Pilkada electoral reform is an important complement to the fiscal 
decentralization that originated in large part due to concerns about the secessionist sentiments in a 
number of outlying provinces of the country. 
A few more important questions emerge from our analysis that merit exploration in future 
work. The first is related to our finding that changes in the fiscal decisions of district governments 
between pre- and post-Pilkada periods are strongly affected not only by whether the district had 
direct elections, but also by the expectation of direct election in the near future. In districts where 
direct elections are imminent, district governments tend to have higher current expenditures on 
public works. On the one hand, this finding has the positive implication that even the expectation of 
a direct election in the predictable and near future is sufficient to change the incentives of district 
governments, perhaps toward greater accountability and better performance. On the other hand, the 
question that arises is whether  the electoral reform could also have the perverse effect of inducing 
spending cycles across the 434 districts of Indonesia (as of 2005) aligned with the electoral cycle, due 
to the manipulation of district expenditures for the purpose of re-election. While it is far too soon to 
address this question, future analysis using a longer series of electoral and fiscal data has the 
potential of doing so.  
The second unresolved question relates to the fact that while the impact of electoral reforms 
is distributed among expenditures in a number of sectors including education, the health sector is a 
notable exception. Is the lack of impact on health expenditures a reflection of citizens‘ priorities, or 
are there other systemic factors that have made it hard for district governments to raise investments 
in health?  
Our analysis is also inconclusive about whether electoral reforms lead to better quality and 
availability of services provided by the district government. While we do not find any impact of 
direct elections on human development outcomes in the two years since direct elections, these 
results may have explanations other than an absence of actual impact. The few indicators we 
measure the impact on, namely outcomes in education and health, may not be the most appropriate 
to capture improvements in the first place or take more time to change than what we have allowed 
for. Tracking a more expanded set of outcome or service delivery indicators over a longer period of 
time is therefore an important area for follow-up work.  30 
 
On the question of whether expenditures in districts that had direct elections were more 
responsive to the ―needs‖ of districts, we find a mixed picture. The increase in district government 
expenditures in districts where direct elections were held, from pre- to post- Pilkada periods, is 
found to have a weak correlation with the needs of citizens. That said, the extent of responsiveness 
to needs is small and dominated by the effects of pre-existing conditions – districts with higher 
public expenditures and better economic conditions to start with were also likely to see higher 
increases in expenditures. This seems to suggest that the changes in expenditures of district 
governments as a result of direct elections, instead of enhancing horizontal equity in public resource 
allocation across districts, could have even reinforced pre-existing inequities. 
To the extent that the change in fiscal behavior of district governments is a likely result of 
increased accountability of governments to citizens, our findings are encouraging for Indonesia, 
where electoral reforms are being implemented across all districts. However, whether the increased 
spending by local governments will indeed lead to more equitable or efficient use of resources across 
the country, which would improve access to and quality of service delivery, remains an open 
question. In the context of the literature on decentralization, our findings constitute evidence that 
political decentralization, when it complements fiscal decentralization, can strengthen the incentives 
of local governments to better utilize the opportunities provided by the latter. A related question 
would be how does the sequencing of political and fiscal decentralization matter for impact and what 
would that suggest for the optimal design of such a reform? Addressing this question would require 
assessing, in addition to what has been done in this paper, what the impacts would be if electoral 
reforms had preceded fiscal decentralization. This remains one more question for future empirical 
research, which would have to be conducted for a country where decentralization has followed such 
a sequence. 31 
 
 
Table 1a: The Impact of Local Elections (PILKADA) on District Government Expenditures per capita 




cient  Administration  Public Works   Transport   Health   Education  Housing  Agriculture  Industry 
Total  
(all sectors) 
Dependent variable: Per capita total expenditure (real terms) 
T*D06     193,861*  23,151  4,376  13,309  63,327*  55,836*  18,742**  14,225  437,447** 
    (102,882)  (20,306)  (9,235)  (8,841)  (32,642)  (31,746)  (7,379)  (9,376)  (221,435) 
# obs  823  750  800  814  814  796  814  788  823 
# districts  174  172  174  174  174  174  174  174  174 
Dependent variable: Per capita development expenditure (real terms) 
T*D06     124,110*  26,676  3,692  5,085  4,933  52,524*  12,400***  10,489  233,960** 
 
  (63,874)  (20,549)  (8,798)  (3,729)  (5,555)  (30,393)  (4,500)  (8,530)  (117,772) 
# obs  815  704  791  802  807  791  806  779  816 
# districts  174  170  174  174  174  174  174  174  174 
Dependent variable: Per capita routine expenditure (real terms) 
T*D06     68,987*  533  1,233  7,970  58,950*  3,235*  6,602**  3,581***  201,885* 
    (40,502)  (1,459)  (900.2)  (5,951)  (30,414)  (1,665)  (3,079)  (1,308)  (105,737) 
# obs  819  738  772  804  803  752  803  743  821 
# districts  174  171  173  174  174  172  174  172  174 
Notes: *: 10% level of significance; **:  5% level of significance; ***: 1% level of significance 
             Standard errors in parentheses estimated based on fixed-effects model with an AR(1) disturbance (Baltagi and Wu, 1999) 
 Districts that held direct elections during 2006-07 are dropped from the regression, which implies that the sample consists of districts that held elections in 2005 and those 
that held no election at all. 
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Table 1b: The Impact of Local Elections (PILKADA) 
on District Government Revenue and Fiscal Balance 
per capita 
 Treatment: T =1 if district held direct election in 2005; T = 0 if 




Revenue from own 
sources  Budget surplust 
T*D06     21,675*  575,565** 
    (11,195)  (257,807) 
# obs  821  823 
# districts  174  174 
Notes:  
*: 10% level of significance; **:  5% level of significance; ***: 1% level of 
significance 
Standard errors in parentheses estimated based on fixed-effects model 
with an AR(1) disturbance (Baltagi and Wu, 1999) 
Districts that held direct elections during 2006 & 2007 are dropped from 
the sample used in the regressions 
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Table 2a:  The impact of Local Elections (PILKADA) on District Government Expenditures per capita by Region  
Treatment: T =1 if district held direct election in 2005; T = 0 if district did not have direct election during 2005-07  
Variable 
Coeffi-
cient  Administration  Public Works   Transport   Health   Education  Housing  Agriculture  Industry 
Total  
(all sectors) 
Districts outside Java and Bali vs. Comparison Districts 
T*D06     378,894***  86,316***  7,178  35,983***  135,161***  108,830**  38,318***  26,828**  905,669*** 
    (138,985)  (27,941)  (12,396)  (11,819)  (43,910)  (43,298)  (9,890)  (12,888)  (298,317) 
# obs  607  542  592  599  599  583  599  577  607 
# districts  130  128  130  130  130  130  130  130  130 
Districts in Java and Bali vs. Comparison Districts 
T*D06     -28,573**  -44,367***  2,925  -13,667***  -22,708**  -5,871  -4,664**  766.6  -123,761*** 
 
  (14,085)  (11,426)  (4,476)  (4,032)  (9,734)  (3,956)  (1,860)  (2,184)  (38,177) 
# obs  569  535  551  564  564  555  564  555  569 
# districts  118  118  118  118  118  118  118  118  118 
Notes: 
*: 10% level of significance; **:  5% level of significance; ***: 1% level of significance 
Standard errors in parentheses estimated based on fixed-effects model with an AR(1) disturbance (Baltagi and Wu, 1999) 




Table 2b: The Impact of Local Elections (PILKADA) on 
District Government Revenue and Fiscal Balance per capita  
by Region 
Treatment: T =1 if district held direct election in 2005; T = 0 if district did not 
have direct election during 2005-07 
Variable 
Coeffi-
cient  Revenue from own sources  Budget surplus 
Districts outside Java and Bali vs. Comparison Districts 
T*D06     45,725***  1.056e+06*** 
    (14,764)  (348,511) 
# obs  605  607 
# districts  130  130 
Districts in Java and Bali vs. Comparison Districts 
T*D06     -6,532  312.5 
    (5,496)  (23,262) 
# obs  567  569 
# districts  118  118 
Notes:  
*: 10% level of significance; **:  5% level of significance; ***: 1% level of significance 
Standard errors in parentheses estimated based on fixed-effects model with an AR(1) 
disturbance (Baltagi and Wu, 1999) 
Districts that held direct elections during 2006 & 2007 are dropped from the sample 




Table 3a:  The impact of Local Elections (PILKADA) on District Government Expenditures per capita: 
Incumbents vs. Controls and Non-Incumbents vs. Controls 
Treatment: T =1 if district held direct election in 2005; T = 0 if district did not have  direct election during 2005-07 
Variable 
Coeffi-
cient  Administration  Public Works   Transport   Health   Education  Housing  Agriculture  Industry 
Total  
(all sectors) 
PILKADA Districts where incumbents were re-elected vs. Comparison Districts 
T*D06     41,015*  24,515  -4,659  1,467  32,346  14,835*  6,593**  5,342*  125,201 
    (21,132)  (20,605)  (6,478)  (4,903)  (20,091)  (7,623)  (3,218)  (2,772)  (76,477) 
# obs  605  563  593  600  600  584  600  587  605 
# districts  127  126  127  127  127  127  127  127  127 
PILKADA Districts where non-incumbents (new heads) were elected vs. Comparison Districts 
T*D06     370,642**  16,109  14,920  27,237**  99,389**  102,368**  32,934***  25,268*  800,965** 
 
  (149,375)  (22,259)  (12,532)  (12,449)  (43,785)  (45,751)  (10,389)  (13,744)  (315,556) 
# obs  571  514  550  563  563  554  563  545  571 
# districts  121  120  121  121  121  121  121  121  121 
Notes:  
*: 10% level of significance; **:  5% level of significance; ***: 1% level of significance 
Standard errors in parentheses estimated based on fixed-effects model with an AR(1) disturbance (Baltagi and Wu, 1999) 




Table 3b: The Impact of Local Elections (PILKADA) 
on District Government Revenue and Fiscal Balance 
per capita:  
Incumbents vs. Controls and  
Non-Incumbents vs. Controls 
Treatment: T =1 if district held direct election in 2005; T = 0 if 




Revenue from own 
sources  Budget surplus 
PILKADA Districts where incumbents were re-elected vs. 
Comparison Districts 
T*D06     12,499  202,093*** 
    (7,958)  (74,650) 
# obs  603  605 
# districts  127  127 
PILKADA Districts where non-incumbents (new heads) 
were elected vs. Comparison Districts 
T*D06     32,696*  1.009e+06*** 
    (14,610)  (369,377) 
# obs  569  571 
# districts  121  121 
Notes:  
*: 10% level of significance; **:  5% level of significance; ***: 1% level of 
significance 
Standard errors in parentheses estimated based on fixed-effects model 
with an AR(1) disturbance (Baltagi and Wu, 1999) 
Districts that held direct elections during 2006 & 2007 are dropped from 






Table 4a: The Impact of Expected Local Elections on District Government Expenditures per capita  
Treatment: T =1 if district held direct election in 2006 or 2007; T =0 if district did not have direct election during 2005-2007 
Variable 
Coeffi-
cient  Administration  Public Works   Transport   Health   Education  Housing  Agriculture  Industry 
Total  
(all sectors) 
Dependent variable: Per capita total expenditure (real terms) 
T*D06     129,244**  227,473**  -28.10  14,562  71,919*  35,087**  33,648**  7,009*  526,141** 
    (62,521)  (92,267)  (14,569)  (9,849)  (42,642)  (16,522)  (14,113)  (4,009)  (219,858) 
# obs  598  546  583  594  594  572  594  576  598 
# districts  133  131  132  133  133  132  133  133  133 
Dependent variable: Per capita development expenditure (real terms) 
T*D06     68,352*  227,993**  499.5  6,746  31,929*  28,722*  24,707**  5,367  329,402** 
 
  (40,315)  (95,717)  (14,559)  (5,949)  (16,383)  (15,256)  (11,800)  (3,991)  (146,076) 
# obs  594  511  578  587  589  570  586  570  596 
# districts  133  128  132  133  133  132  133  133  133 
Dependent variable: Per capita routine expenditure (real terms) 
T*D06     63,648**  2,904  741.3  7,948*  46,414  7,060***  10,587***  1,873***  194,073** 
    (25,171)  (1,853)  (694.4)  (4,791)  (28,329)  (2,044)  (3,038)  (501.9)  (77,148) 
# obs  592  533  559  585  585  542  584  547  597 
# districts   133  131  131  133  133  131  133  131  133 
Note:  
*: 10% level of significance; **:  5% level of significance; ***: 1% level of significance 
Standard errors in parentheses estimated based on fixed-effects model with an AR(1) disturbance (Baltagi and Wu, 1999) 38 
 
 
Table 4b: The Impact of Expected Local Elections on District 
Government Revenue and Fiscal Balance per capita  
Treatment: T =1 if district held direct election in 2006 or 2007; T =0 if district did 
not have direct election during 2005-2007 
Variable 
Coeffi-
cient  Revenue from own sources  Budget surplus 
T*D06     43,588*  258,792*** 
    (23,359)  (66,738) 
# obs  596  598 
# districts  133  133 
Notes:  
*: 10% level of significance; **:  5% level of significance; ***: 1% level of significance 
Standard errors in parentheses estimated based on fixed-effects model with an AR(1) 







Table 5: Determinants of change in district government expenditures from pre- to post-Pilkada periods – selected results 
Dependent variable: difference between post- Pilkada (2006) and pre- Pilkada (average 2001-05) expenditures – for each sector and all sectors combined 
  T=1  
 
Districts with Direct Elections in 2005 
T=0 
Districts did not have direct elections during 
2005-2007 












Status of public services on or before 2001 (including stock of facilities and penetration rate of 
services) 
 
Proportion of child delivery helped by health professional in public sector 
facilities (2001) 
       
 
   
No. of total Senior High School (2000)    (-)**         
Net  enrollment in junior high schools for children of 13-15 years (2001)             
Net  enrollment in senior high schools for children of 16-18 years (2001)      (+)*       
Share of people ever/being in higher secondary school in total population 
(2001) 
           
Initial conditions (economic and fiscal), political & institutional environment 
Political fragmentation index (2004) in district  (-)**           
Bureaucracy Size (2001)  (-)*    (-)*  (+)*     
Number of corruption cases on trial and covered by media (2004)    (-)*         
Share of district in total no. of corruption cases in province (2004)  (-)**           
DPRD Total Expenditure in real terms (2001)  (+)*  (+)**  (+)*  (-)***  (-)**  (+)** 
Log of per capita GDP real (2001)  (+)***  (+)***    (+)***  (+)***  (-)* 
Regional and rural/urban dummy 
Dummy for urban (Kota)      (+)**       
Dummy for Nasua Tengara and Maluku    (+)**    (+)**     
Dummy for Papua  (-)**           
             
# of observations  99  99  99  74  74  74 
R-squared
  0.651  0.730  0.694  0.67  0.725  0.67 
Note: *: 10% level of significance; **:  5% level of significance; ***: 1% level of significance 
Significance level based on robust standard errors. 
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Table A-1: Identifying the determinants of indirect and direct election 
VARIABLES  Eligibility to appear in direct election as 
per Law No. 34/2004 
Eligibility to appear in indirect 
election as per Law No. 22/1999 
1. Political Criteria       
Last govt. served full term  4.474*** (0.44)  2.911*** (0.54) 
2.Economy     
Unemployment rate  2.03 (4.35)  -3.23 (6.57) 
Log of per capita real GRDP  -1.05 (1.10)  0.73 (1.98) 
Log of real GRDP without Oil and Gas  1.01 (1.02)  0.04  (1.94) 
Share of minerals in GRDP  1.54 (1.82)  -1.89 (2.40) 
Share of energy in GRDP  -21.03 (20.98)  11.74 (22.72) 
Dummy for GRDP with Oil and gas  0.39 (0.54)  -0.83 (0.67) 
3.District Characteristics and location     
Share of urban population  -0.19 (1.62)  -1.13 (1.49) 
Share of asphalt road in the district  0.31 (1.39)  1.65 (1.45) 
Share of road build by rocks  -1.55 (1.95)  2.79 (1.93) 
Access to telephone per households  1.24 (2.94)  1.97 (3.67) 
Distance of the district to province capital  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00) 
Dummy to identify split districts  0.19 (0.44)  0.35 (0.46) 
Share of hilly area in the district  0.82 (1.15)  -0.12 (1.00) 
Share of coastal area in the district  -1.20 (1.06)  0.83 (1.18) 
Share of valley area in the district  -2.95 (2.16)  -0.09 (2.19) 
Dummy for kota (=1)  0.21 (1.14)  0.03 (1.03) 
Regional/island dummies (With reference to Java bali)  
Dummy for Sumatra   0.19 (0.59)  0.22 (0.51) 
Dummy for Kalimanthan  0.77 (0.76)  -0.08 (0.76) 
Dummy for Sulawesi  1.234* (0.66)  -0.66 (0.63) 
Dummy for Nasua Tengara and Maluku  1.08 (0.82)  0.15  (0.76) 
Dummy for Papua  (0.45) (1.39)   
Constant  -1.521 (6.42)  -14.22** (6.31) 
Observations  331  246 
Note: All determinants used represent corresponding years. 
 Figures in the parenthesis indicate standard errors. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Annex A 
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Table A-2a: The Impact of PILKADA on District Government Expenditure SHARES 
Variable 
Coeffi-
cient  Administration  Public Works   Transport   Health   Education  Housing  Agriculture  Industry 
T*D06     0.0115  -0.0141  -0.00243  0.00224  0.000327  0.00134  0.00329**  -0.00102 
    (0.0144)  (0.00937)  (0.00524)  (0.00214)  (0.00763)  (0.00601)  (0.00159)  (0.00269) 
# obs  823  750  800  814  814  796  814  788 
# districts  174  172  174  174  174  174  174  174 
 
 




Revenue  from  own 
sources 




revenue sharing  DAU allocation  Other Revenues 
T*D06     0.00268  0.00773  0.00364  -0.00171  -0.0110** 
    (0.00256)  (0.00552)  (0.00408)  (0.00610)  (0.00540) 
# obs  821  816  788  820  787 
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Impact of direct elections on education and health outcomes 
To measure the impact of direct elections on human development outcomes, we estimate 
equations analogous to (1) and (2) above, with the main difference that we now include observations 
from both 2006 and 2007 as post-Pilkada observations. This is done because any impact on outcome 
indicators is likely to take more time to occur than on fiscal indicators, and the availability of district 
level outcome indicators (from SUSENAS) up to 2007 allows us to analyze impacts over a slightly 
longer time horizon. The model to estimate the impact when the treatment is ―direct election‖ is 
given by: 
mt m mt YD T YD T YD YD T O                 07 * 06 * 07 06 2 1 2 1 0    (1) 
where Omt is an education or health outcome for district m at time t (2001 to 2007); T and YD06 
have the same definition as in (1); and YD07 takes the value 1 if the observation is for 2007 and 0 
otherwise. The parameter β has the same interpretation as in (1). Parameters δ1 and δ2 identify the 
―time effect‖ on the dependent variable for 2006 and 2007 respectively. DID estimates of the 
impact of the direct election on the dependent variable are given by γ1 and γ2 for the years 2006 and 
2007, respectively. 
To identify impacts of direct elections on outcomes, as opposed to expenditures and revenues, we 
estimate equations (3). The dependent variable is a specific education or health outcome variable for 
district m at time t. The health outcomes considered as dependent variables are the proportions of 
outpatients in public facilities and deliveries helped by public health professionals. The education 
outcomes considered are net enrollment and attendance rates in primary, junior secondary, and 
senior secondary schools. 
We find that the DID estimate is insignificant for all outcomes and for both types of 
treatment definitions and post-Pilkada years 2006 and 2007. In other words, being in the treatment 
group had no impact on education and health outcomes post-Pilkada, relative to the control group 
(Table B-1). The time dummies (for both years 2006 and 2007) are positive and strongly significant 
for all outcomes and both types of definitions of treatment – with the sole exception of the dummy 
for 2006 on net primary enrollment rate. This suggests that while the treatment group did not show 
any additional improvement post-Pilkada, the average outcomes for all districts improved 
significantly in both 2006 and 2007. 
Therefore, although we find evidence that expenditure on public services increased in 
districts with direct elections, the spending has not yet been translated into better outcomes in 
service delivery. This may because the expenditures are ineffective in improving outcomes. 
Alternatively, as argued before, these outcomes may not be the most appropriate to capture 
improvements in the first place, particularly in the quality dimension, or perhaps enough time has 
not elapsed for the impacts to show on outcome indicators that are often slow to change.  
   Annex B 
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Table B-1: DID analysis of impact of direct elections on district level outcome indicators in education and health 
 




outpatients in public 
facilities 
Proportion of deliveries 
helped by public health 
professionals 
Net enrollment rates 
in primary schools 
Net enrollment rates 
in junior secondary 
schools 
Net enrollment rates 




Attendance rate in 
Junior high 
Attendance rate in 
Senior high schools 
Treatment: T (=1 if district held direct election in 2005; 0 if district had no direct election) 
T  -0.0247**  0.0212*  0.00762**  0.0277**  0.0270**  0.00785  0.0253**  0.0202* 
T*D06  0.010  -0.009  0.011  0.008  0.004  0.008  0.007  0.016 
T*D07  0.011  0.023  -0.002  -0.007  0.004  -0.002  -0.008  0.002 
YD06  0.0731**  0.0652**  0.00374  0.0554**  0.0476**  0.0367**  0.0893**  0.0897** 
YD07  0.0775**  0.0961**  0.0165**  0.0680**  0.0500**  0.0478**  0.0942**  0.105** 
Constant  0.387**  0.148**  0.952**  0.775**  0.501**  0.882**  0.558**  0.345** 
# Obs  1735  1735  1735  1735  1735  1735  1735  1735 
R-squared  0.099  0.054  0.031  0.064  0.029  0.061  0.093  0.093 
                   
Note: *: 10% level of significance; **:  5% level of significance; ***: 1% level of significance 
Districts that held direct elections during 2006-07 are dropped from these regressions, implying that the sample consists of districts that held elections in 2005 and those that held 
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Table C1: Analysis of whether increases in District Government Expenditures were “Needs-Based” 
(a): Dependent Variable: Difference in Expenditures for all Sectors and Budget Deficit (Post-Pilkada-Pre-Pilkada)   
  
Variables 
















-1.587e+06  -1.435e+06  -2.948e+06  -1.029e+06  28,241  262,107  222,144  -126,771 
No. of kindergarten podes00 
2,501*  2,313*  4,764*  1,727  201.5  219.0  420.5  67.74 
No. of Public Primary School, podes00 
-1,728  -1,808  -3,349  -789.9  365.9  321.9  492.8  143.8 
No. of Public Secondary School, podes00 
7,518  14,739  20,332  6,368  1,585  -1,137  1,287  1,300 
No. of total Senior High School, podes00 
-15,766  -13,640  -29,353  -9,142  -1,431  -402.5  -2,146  2,098 
Net    enrollment  in  primary  schools  for 
children 7-12 years, Susenas 2001 
-1.352e+06  -273,717  -1.501e+06  251,714  -481,339  -971,656  -1.139e+06  -3,175 
Net    enrollment  in  junior  high  schools  for 
children of 13-15 years, Susenas 2001 
-6.386e+06  -6.181e+06  -1.251e+07  -6.739e+06  -739,578  -293,718  -1.153e+06  -390,829 
Net    enrollment  in  senior  high  schools  for 
children of 16-18 years, Susenas 2001 
6.081e+06  4.966e+06  1.117e+07  6.112e+06*  1.154e+06  398,213  1.658e+06  478,513 
Attendance  rate  in  primary    schools  for 
children of 7-12 years, Susenas 2001 
4.498e+06  4.434e+06  8.452e+06  4.152e+06  1.428e+06  1.075e+06  2.263e+06  455,858 
Attendance  rate  in  junior  high  schools  for 
children of 13-15 years, Susenas 2001 
-4.190e+06  -4.768e+06  -8.618e+06  -2.885e+06  -171,459  -822,231  -759,882  325,999 
Attendance  rate  in  senior  high  schools  for 
children of 16-18 years, Susenas 2001 
1.445e+06  2.695e+06  3.667e+06  -2.137e+06  -1.336e+06  -34,906  -1.168e+06  -868,769 
pca_access_to_school  (Index  to  identify 
difficulties in access to schools) 
-4,206  42,078  35,928  -24,490  -184,901  -182,761  -373,311  19,383 
Share of people ever/being in primary School 
per total population;SUS01 
4.196e+06  4.586e+06  8.415e+06  4.312e+06  2.010e+06  1.291e+06  2.943e+06  686,257 
Share  of  people  ever/being  in  junior 
Secondary School in total population;SUS01 
3.672e+06  1.325e+06  5.106e+06  7.700e+06  1.058e+06  -37,575  695,650  435,022 
Share  of  people  ever/being  in  higher 
secondary School in total population;SUS01 
-1.219e+07  -8.791e+06  -2.121e+07  -1.728e+07  -398,161  1.471e+06  1.291e+06  1.133e+06 
Share  of  population  who  achieved  tertiary 
education, SUSENAS 2002 
1.997e+07  1.867e+07  3.783e+07  1.833e+07  -2.406e+06  -2.224e+06  -4.011e+06  -3.683e+06* 
Share of population who achieved secondary 
(High School- Dipl) education, SUSENAS 02 
-1.007e+07  -6.611e+06  -1.677e+07  -2.961e+06  843,694  -819,176  -125,166  -910,386 
Average  years  of  schooling  for  population, 
SUSENAS 2002 
-18,886  -149,345  -144,905  -51,907  -42,994  73,461  10,134  -32,141   Annex C 
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No of villages, SD drop out increase sharply 
(PODES2000) 
67,200  61,911  128,935  26,087  52,895  54,857*  113,119*  -22,524 
No of villages, SMP drop out increase sharply 
(PODES2000) 
-198,340*  -198,248*  -397,218*  -136,886  -32,460  -37,432*  -68,564  8,014 
Proportion  of  outpatients  in  public  sector 
facilities, Susenas, 2001 
-436,505  -454,854  -882,398  -760,235  -130,962  -258,791  -389,528  159,334 
Proportion of child delivery helped by health 
professionals  in  public  sector  facilities, 
Susenas, 2001 
-6.108e+07 
-5.082e+07  -1.127e+08  -5.287e+07  -6.154e+06  -4.878e+06  -1.135e+07  4.026e+06 
No. of hospitals podes00 
-29,992  -23,180  -50,885  -25,938  14,557  21,740  40,736  8,694 
No. of maternity hospitals podes00 
10,108  9,380  17,771  1,187  10,274  -6,580  5,139  7,763 
No.  of  public  health  facilities  (puskesmas) 
podes00 
3,385  3,099  4,925  3,482  -14,628  -14,427  -26,895  -9,766 
No. of clinical doctors podes00 
-2,699  -3,068  -5,586  -1,840  -257.4  -78.75  -459.1  -385.6 
pca_access_to_health  (Index  to  identify 
difficulties in access to health facilities) 
104,274  99,403  207,246  53,636  57,691  112,860*  175,819  19,617 
Political fragmentation index, DPRD 2004 in 
district 
-600,906  -492,299  -1.114e+06  -587,365  -24,652  -3,392  -17,693  25,418 
Bureaucracy Size, source:SIKD2001 
-38,368  -35,853*  -73,925*  -30,775*  -1,469  8,808*  7,533  -4,839 
Number  of  corruption  cases  covered  by 
media, district, ICW:2004 
19,263  24,621  37,217  -134,604  14,301  20,293  24,414  57,425 
Number of corruption cases on trial; covered 
by media, district, ICW:2004 
-517,178  -479,189  -1.002e+06  -158,667  -32,660  -179,762  -211,825  -9,318 
DPRD Total Expenditure; sikd 2001 real RPs 
0.000409**  0.000366**  0.000774**  0.000338*  -2.41e-05  -3.36e-05  -6.54e-05*  4.08e-05** 
Ln per capita Real GDP, 2001 
1.172e+06**  1.082e+06**  2.240e+06***  610,014  243,503***  408,400***  663,559***  -102,840* 
pca_industry  (Index  of  level  of 
industrialization in the district) 
134,258  138,007  268,201  69,434  -14,593  5,706  -11,695  -36,471 
Wage  Bill  for  Civil  servants  (Billion  Rps), 
Source DAU, 2002 
734,418  595,384  1.315e+06  832,728  20,309  -154,047  -181,714  86,616 
Dummy for kota (1=Kota, 0= Kabupaten) 
1.706e+06  1.552e+06  3.239e+06  1.680e+06*  -38,618  -192,514  -310,371  -41,717 
Dummy for Sumatra  
577,570  532,386  1.157e+06  270,893  76,383  33,651  105,780  -113,825 
Dummy for Kalimanthan 
-571,464  -732,992  -1.260e+06  -545,815  303,564  133,745  429,931  69,346 
Dummy for Sulawesi 
312,297  99,370  506,567  82,556  30,414  39,143  20,052  -116,028   Annex C 
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Dummy for Nasua Tengara and Maluku 
889,334  765,452  1.702e+06  625,952  88,148  223,528  304,438  -179,727 
Dummy for Papua 
-183,124  -336,493  -498,836  -471,406  2.145e+06  2.012e+06  4.150e+06  -228,327 
Constant 
-5.517e+06  -6.612e+06  -1.199e+07  1.653e+06  -3.510e+06  -7.278e+06***  -1.133e+07***  2.024e+06 
   
     
       
# observations 
99  98  99  99  74  73  74  74 
R-squared 
0.741  0.738  0.741  0.694  0.659  0.823  0.787  0.670 
   Annex C 




(b):  Dependent Variable: Difference in Expenditures in Health sector (Post-Pilkada-Pre-Pilkada)         
Variables 
Post-pre difference in Treat Group ( T=1)      Post-pre difference in Control  Group ( T=0): 
Development 
exp  Routine exp  Total exp     
Development 
exp  Routine exp  Total exp 
Poverty rate  67,348**  70,939  138,412* 
 
  -4,157  48,366**  46,162** 
Proportion  of  outpatients  in  public  sector 
facilities, Susenas, 2001 
51,164  -21,095  28,659 
 
  -13,358  -4,593  -11,034 
Proportion of child delivery helped by health 
professional  in  public  sector  facilities, 
Susenas, 2001 
-994,142  -3.576e+06  -4.482e+06   
  -459,372  -237,944  -536,294 
No. of hospitals podes00 
-1,102  -3,747  -4,905 
 
 
-336.2  1,230  1,106 
No. of maternity hospitals podes00 
158.1  334.3  484.6 
   
619.2  -524.5  102.3 
No.  of  public  health  facilities  (puskesmas) 
podes00 
-990.2*  -672.6  -1,586 
 
  171.4  173.3  299.9 
No. of clinical doctors podes00 
0.746  15.57  15.50 
 
 
-36.71  -39.43  -78.14 
pca_access_to_health  (Index  to  identify 
difficulties in access to health facilities) 
1,727  6,771  9,409 
 
  597.6  3,457  4,508 
Political fragmentation index, DPRD 2004 in 
district 
-26,955**  -50,971*  -77,423** 
 
  2,125  -1,643  -636.7 
Bureaucracy Size, source:SIKD2001 
-870.1  -2,091  -3,097* 
   
-95.86  1,127**  1,010* 
Number  of  corruption  cases  covered  by 
media, district, ICW:2004 
-2,983  -5,600  -8,830 
    -1,575  1,274  280.3 
Number of corruption cases on trial; covered 
by media, district, ICW:2004 
-11,458  -35,184*  -47,412* 
 
  735.6  -18,321  -18,702 
DPRD Total Expenditure; sikd 2001 real RPs 
5.27e-06  1.64e-05*  2.17e-05* 
 
 
-2.64e-06**  -8.72e-06***  -1.14e-05*** 
Ln per capita Real GDP, 2001 
40,883***  49,530**  91,565*** 
 
 
18,197**  59,314***  78,728*** 
Wage  Bill  for  Civil  servants  (Billion  Rps), 
Source DAU, 2002 
10,720  23,877  35,070 
    18,776**  -12,993  4,640 
Dummy for kota (1=Kota, 0= Kabupaten) 
-9,035  20,778  11,741 
   
4,461  8,612  8,417 
Dummy for Sumatra  
2,393  19,352  20,534 
 
 
-11,583  -13,798  -24,953   Annex C 
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Dummy for Kalimanthan 
14,745  -26,888  -14,016 
   
15,239  -16,264  -1,454 
Dummy for Sulawesi 
-2,208  15,112  9,183 
 
 
3,758  -5,824  -5,399 
Dummy for Nasua Tengara and Maluku 
8,495  34,948  42,879 
 
 
7,061  20,985**  27,480** 
Dummy for Papua 
-53,264***  -59,173*  -113,219** 
   
13,467  38,815*  48,724 
Constant 
-444,849*  -372,244  -828,808 
   
-78,606  -997,409***  -1.105e+06*** 
 
     
 
 
     
# observations 
99  98  99 
 
 
74  73  74 
R-squared 
0.640  0.625  0.651 
   
0.523  0.791  0.765 
   Annex C 




(c): Dependent Variable: Difference in Expenditures in Education sector (Post-Pilkada-Pre-Pilkada)         
Variable 
Post-pre difference in Treat Group ( T=1)      Post-pre difference in Control  Group ( T=0): 
Development 
exp 
Routine exp  Total exp 
 
  Development 
exp 
Routine exp  Total exp 
Poverty rate 
12,132  -334,462  -337,723 
 
 
-23,497  152,493*  128,318 
No. of kindergarten podes00 
36.30  537.0*  574.4** 
 
 
55.75  55.94  98.08 
No. of Public Primary School, podes00 
-27.14  -512.0  -526.1 
 
 
21.66  16.17  -16.51 
No. of Public Secondary School, podes00 
-941.6  6,035  5,064 
   
-368.6  515.3  480.4 
No. of total Senior High School, podes00 
-570.5  -5,865**  -6,398** 
 
 
-152.3  -701.4  -731.6 
Net    enrollment  in  primary  schools  for 
children 7-12 years, Susenas 2001 
-202,683  -263,738  -613,623 
    -152,770  106,378  26,187 
Net    enrollment  in  junior  high  schools  for 
children of 13-15 years, Susenas 2001 
306,030**  -1.15e+06  -841,823 
 
  -48,002  -87,156  -167,413 
Net    enrollment  in  senior  high  schools  for 
children of 16-18 years, Susenas 2001 
-186,005  1.231e+06  1.052e+06 
 
  -79,635  -7,966  -44,590 
Attendance  rate  in  primary    schools  for 
children of 7-12 years, Susenas 2001 
-103,437  1.201e+06  1.122e+06 
    184,367  250,800  402,563 
Attendance  rate  in  junior  high  schools  for 
children of 13-15 years, Susenas 2001 
56,550  -1.172e+06  -1.153e+06 
 
  27,234  -313,301  -237,209 
Attendance  rate  in  senior  high  schools  for 
children of 16-18 years, Susenas 2001 
426,260  1.939e+06  2.379e+06* 
    -13,605  160,685  237,831 
pca_access_to_school  (Index  to  identify 
difficulties in access to schools) 
1,091  18,816  22,554 
 
  -23,608  -31,011  -46,068 
Share of people ever/being in primary School 
in total population;SUS01 
-157,014  1.763e+06  1.643e+06 
 
  441,820**  9,067  373,818 
Share  of  people  ever/being  in  junior 
Secondary School in total population;SUS01 
-752,168*  -210,743  -984,704 
    139,834  592,954  566,713 
Share  of  people  ever/being  in  high 
secondary School in total population;SUS01 
997,375  -5,225  1.109e+06 
    446,282  -288,467  268,472 
Share  of  population  who  achieved  tertiary 
education, SUSENAS 2002 
-267,084  466,528  204,343 
    -599,423  -109,285  -466,028 
Share of population who achieved secondary 
(High School- Dipl) education, SUSENAS 02 
-670,308  -3.353e+06  -4.107e+06* 
 
  -187,324  155,916  -63,637   Annex C 
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Average  years  of  schooling  for  population, 
SUSENAS 2002 
10,549  -2,551  7,821 
 
  12,484  555.1  5,713 
No of villages, SD drop out increase sharply 
(PODES2000) 
2,062  -422.1  1,871 
 
  -762.8  17,039  18,777 
No of villages, SMP drop out increase sharply 
(PODES2000) 
-944.6  -54,089*  -56,258* 
    -1,541  -10,084  -12,857 
Political fragmentation index, DPRD 2004 in 
district 
-330.5  -131,132  -128,657 
 
  4,088  -16,800  -12,559 
Bureaucracy Size, source:SIKD2001 
392.5  -7,923  -8,402 
   
-11.44  -389.8  -157.6 
Number  of  corruption  cases  covered  by 
media, district, ICW:2004 
20,996  46,706  67,032 
 
  12,079  5,924  17,639 
Number of corruption cases on trial; covered 
by media, district, ICW:2004 
-39,774  -188,104*  -229,951** 
 
  1,352  -50,866  -55,366 
DPRD Total Expenditure; sikd 2001 real RPs 
-1.65e-06  9.45e-05**  9.28e-05** 
   
1.12e-06  -1.45e-05**  -1.55e-05** 
Ln per capita Real GDP, 2001  52,377***  294,423***  349,647*** 
    19,213  141,671***  168,249*** 
Wage  Bill  for  Civil  servants  (Billion  Rps), 
Source DAU, 2002 
-30,430  -9,906  -36,550 
 
  52,827  -31,588  -5,053 
Dummy for kota (1=Kota, 0= Kabupaten) 
-61,427  226,098  163,866 
 
 
19,149  -31,294  -42,909 
Dummy for Sumatra  
49,769*  216,220  257,505 
   
-1,910  -4,482  -3,723 
Dummy for Kalimanthan 
38,344  -118,847  -89,729 
 
 
32,044  39,014  67,162 
Dummy for Sulawesi 
75,061*  165,592  229,580 
 
 
22,417  -11,832  -7,377 
Dummy for Nasua Tengara and Maluku 
34,849  342,017  367,700* 
   
27,113  44,878  57,691 
Dummy for Papua 
36,423  196,154  222,132 
 
 
319,741  322,409  522,577 
Constant 
-938,226**  -4.356e+06*  -5.167e+06** 
 
 
-2,864  -2.428e+06***  -2.751e+06*** 
 
     
 
 
     
# observations 
99  98  99 
   
74  73  74 
R-squared 
0.580  0.718  0.730 
 
 
0.436  0.717  0.725 
Note: *: 10% level of significance; **:  5% level of significance; ***: 1% level of significance 
Significance level based on robust standard errors   
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Variables in needs analysis regressions (Table C1,a,b,c above) 
Initial stock variables      
(1)  “Coverage  rate”  or  socio-economic  development  indicators  pre-decentralization:  shares  of 
population who have ever been in primary, junior high, and secondary schools (2001); shares of 
population who achieved tertiary education and secondary (high school-diploma) education (2002); 
average years of schooling of population (2002); net enrollment rate in primary, junior high and 
secondary (2001); attendance  rate in  primary,  junior high,  and secondary (2001);  no.  of villages 
where primary or junior high school dropouts increase sharply (2000);  proportion of deliveries 
helped by public health professionals and proportion of outpatients in public sector facilities (2001).  
(2) Stock of public facilities in education and health (all for 2000): no. of kindergartens, public primary, 
secondary, and senior high schools, difficulty in accessing schools measured by distance; no. of 
hospital  and  maternity  hospitals,  public  primary health  facilities  (puskesmas)  and  clinic  doctors, 
difficulties in accessing health facilities. 
Initial economic and fiscal conditions, institutional and civic variables (  )  
Political Fragmentation Index for each district (2004), size of bureaucracy (2001) wage bill for civil 
servants in 2002 (billion Rps); no. of corruption cases covered by media for each district, no. of 
corruption cases on trial and covered by media; log of per capita real GDP, poverty rate, total 
expenditure of DPRD (2001) and level of industrialization.  
Table C-4 below lists the variables used to construct first principal component indices for access to 
school, health facilities and industrialization. 
Table C-4: Interpretation of principle component indices 
Index (The first principal component)  Variables used 
Access to school: Index to identify 
difficulty in accessing schools 
Distances of primary, junior high, and secondary schools 
from the village 
Access to health: Index to identify 
difficulty  in  accessing  health 
facilities  
Number  of  villages  in  the  district  with  difficulties  in 
accessing  hospitals,  other  public  health  facilities  like 
puskesmas, maternity hospitals, and difficulties in access 
to pharmacies.  
Pca_industry:  Level  of 
industrialization in the district 
No.  of  manufacturing,  leather,  food,  brick,  and  other 
industrial units in the district 
 
 